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FROM THE GRIDIRON TO THE GOLDEN 
STATE: NFL PLAYERS’ FIGHT FOR 
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION RIGHTS IN 
CALIFORNIA 
KYLE M. TOMPKINS∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Football is not only a physical and dangerous game, but it is also a 
hazardous profession for those who make a living playing the sport.  After 
years of bone-crushing hits and blows to the head, countless retired National 
Football League (NFL) players are experiencing the effects of long-term, 
disabling injuries. 
As a result, professional football players began filing workers’ 
compensation claims in California because the system works to the advantage 
of professional athletes employed in other states by offering benefits not 
available in other states.1  Slowly over time, hundreds of players with claims 
filed in California have received awards or settlements of over $100,000 each 
as compensation for long-term injuries sustained while playing football.2  
Moreover, the current debate over the causal link between football head 
injuries and the onset of dementia-like diseases is likely to spur even more 
controversy over football injuries in the coming years.3 
Take the unfortunate story of Ron Johnson.  Once a feared running back 
on the gridiron at the University of Michigan and for the New York Giants, he 
is now only a shell of his former self.4  Johnson was diagnosed with 
Alzheimer’s disease in 2008, and he now lives in an assisted living community 
 
∗  Kyle M. Tompkins is a third-year law student at Marquette University Law School.  Upon 
graduation in May 2013, he will earn a Certificate in Sports Law from the National Sports Law 
Institute.  Kyle is a 2010 graduate of the University of Illinois at Urbana/Champaign, where he earned 
a B.A. in Political Science with a minor in International Studies.  Kyle currently serves as the 
Executive Editor of the Marquette Sports Law Review. 
1.  Alan Schwarz, Teams Dispute Workers' Comp Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2010, at B11. 
2.  Id. 
3.  See Mark Noonan, Minding Dementia's Impact on Workers' Comp, RISK & INS. (Aug. 5, 
2010), http://www.riskandinsurance.com/story.jsp?storyId=494391032. 
4.  William C. Rhoden, Ex-Giant's Case Is a Window on N.F.L. Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 
2011, at D1. 
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at the age of sixty-three because he cannot care for himself.5  The NFL’s 88 
Plan, which was designed to help those retired players suffering from 
dementia and other long-term disabilities, provides Johnson’s family with 
$7333 per month to help with the costs of the assisted living.6  However, his 
costs at the assisted living facility amount to over $8000 per month when 
including his medications.7  During his playing career, Johnson was never 
diagnosed with a concussion, but it is widely believed that football contributed 
to his condition.8 
Like Johnson, after many NFL players retire, they continue to suffer from 
long-term mental and physical injuries that become expensive to treat over 
many years,9 and players fail to receive adequate compensation.  For instance, 
despite the blockbuster multi-million dollar, multi-year deals discussed in the 
media, most salaries are modest and short in comparison.  The median salary 
of an NFL player in 2011 was $770,000 with a median career length of 3.5 
years.10  Although players do in fact receive a high salary, it is typically for a 
short length of time, and cumulative trauma could extremely limit their 
employment opportunities for the rest of their lives.  Consequently, after they 
exhaust their resources through contractual provisions or the NFL’s negotiated 
benefit programs for former players, which some former players believe to be 
inherently flawed,11 many players have turned to California’s workers’ 
compensation system. 
Although California is not the only state where NFL players choose to file 
workers’ compensation claims,12 it is the general focus of this Comment.  
California’s workers’ compensation system offers comparatively greater 
 
5.  Id. 
6.  Id. 
7.  Id. 
8.  See id. 
9.  See Peter King, One Team, 25 Years On, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Dec. 12, 2011, at 74, 76–
77; see also Jim Schenke, Purdue Research Supports Key Element of Concussion Lawsuit, PURDUE 
UNIV. (June 11, 2012), http://www.purdue.edu/newsroom/general/2012/120611T-TalavageNFLPA 
.html. 
10.  The Average NFL Player, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Jan. 27, 2011), http://www.busine 
ssweek.com/magazine/content/11_06/b4214058615722.htm. 
11.  NFL, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT arts. 41, 58, 61–62, 64–65 (2011) 
[hereinafter 2011 NFL CBA]; Class Action Complaint (Jury Trial Demanded) ¶ 61, Eller v. NFL 
Players Ass’n, 872 F. Supp. 2d 823 (D. Minn. 2012) (No. 11CV02623) [hereinafter Eller Complaint]. 
12.  Several Washington Redskins players have filed workers’ compensation claims in 
Maryland because it offered greater benefits than Virginia, where the team and insurer argued a 
majority of employment took place.  Darren Rovell, Teams Face Workers’ Comp Threat, ESPN (Aug. 
30, 2012), http://espn.go.com/espn/otl/story/_/id/8316657/nfl-teams-facing-large-bills-related-
workers-compensation-claims-head-injuries. 
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benefits than other states, such as awards for injuries based on cumulative 
trauma.13  For NFL teams and their insurers, though, these claims are 
becoming increasingly expensive,14 and they are finding legal ways to keep 
claims out of California.  Despite the cost to the NFL, former and current NFL 
players have rights as workers to compensation for workplace injuries (based 
on a single game or an entire career), and the law should not foreclose their 
ability to be made whole through workers’ compensation in California based 
on its interest in such claims. 
Section II of this Comment briefly describes workers’ compensation law 
with a focus on California and the NFL.  It also demonstrates how the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution affects California’s 
jurisdictional reach in these types of claims.  Section III then analyzes the 
various ways NFL teams have challenged California’s jurisdiction over 
workers’ compensation claims filed by NFL players and reviews the current 
state of the law based on a recent Ninth Circuit decision.  Section IV considers 
alternative means to ensure NFL players receive adequate compensation 
should the NFL, its teams, and advocates successfully close the legal loophole 
that players take advantage of within California’s workers’ compensation 
system.  Section V concludes that former NFL players should be entitled to 
compensation for their workplace injuries through the force of law because the 
currently available alternatives fail to adequately compensate them. 
II.  CALIFORNIA WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW AND THE FULL FAITH AND 
CREDIT CLAUSE 
California’s workers’ compensation law allows professional football 
players to seek redress for injuries suffered throughout their entire playing 
careers.  Thus, an understanding of workers’ compensation law in general, 
California’s specific statutory provisions, and the Full Faith and Credit Clause 
are critical to fully grasping why NFL players file claims for workers’ 
compensation in the first place and why they file in California specifically. 
A.  California’s Workers’ Compensation System 
In general, workers’ compensation law is a creature of statutes intended to 
compensate employees for workplace injuries, but the manner in which these 
benefits are provided varies widely between the fifty states.15  The common 
 
13.  Id. 
14.  Id. 
15.  See Matthew J. MITTEN ET AL., SPORTS LAW AND REGULATION: CASES, MATERIALS, AND 
PROBLEMS 978‒79 (2d ed. 2009). 
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requirements between each system, though, are: (1) the individual seeking 
benefits is statutorily defined as an employee; and (2) the injury “arises out of” 
or “in the course of” the employment.16  Furthermore, modern workers’ 
compensation systems function as strict liability regimes as employees do not 
have to prove any breach of a duty or violation of statutory liability, and 
common law defenses, such as contributory negligence and assumption of the 
risk, are not available to employers.17  In exchange, employees “relinquish[] 
rights to pursue tort actions against their employers” that could result in larger 
awards.18 
Professional athletes are employees for purposes of workers’ 
compensation in most cases, so they are entitled to the statutory benefits under 
specific statutory frameworks.19  However, because professional sports is a 
unique industry, some states offer athletes better protections or greater benefits 
than other states, and several aspects of California’s workers’ compensation 
system make it especially appealing to former NFL players.20 
As an initial matter, professional athletes are included within the statutory 
definition of employee in California.21  Another provision allows employees 
to recover for injuries that are either specific or cumulative in nature.22  
Cumulative injuries are defined as “occurring as repetitive mentally or 
physically traumatic activities extending over a period of time, the combined 
effect of which causes any disability or need for medical treatment.”23  For 
professional football players, this distinction is critical because repetitive 
trauma is inherent to playing football, and many players continue to suffer 
from the long-term effects well after they retire.24 
Additionally, other provisions provide evidence of California’s public 
policy supporting its interest in adjudicating claims that arise within its 
borders.  For instance, section 5000 of the California Labor Code states that no 
agreement shall exempt any employer of its liability to compensate its 
employees under workers’ compensation.25  Under this section, it is 
reasonable to infer that contractual clauses that may deprive California 
 
16.  Id. at 979. 
17.  Id. at 978. 
18.  Id. 
19.  See id. 978‒79. 
20.  See Rovell, supra note 12. 
21.  See generally CAL. LAB. CODE § 3351 (West 2011). 
22.  Id. § 3208.1. 
23.  Id. 
24.  See King, supra note 8, at 74, 76–77; see also Schenke, supra note 8. 
25.  See § 5000. 
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employees of the benefits they are entitled to under its laws or that may 
substitute such benefits for less favorable ones, such as choice of law or forum 
selection, are disfavored by California.  Furthermore, section 3600.5 addresses 
coverage of out-of-state employees temporarily employed within California.26  
Under California law, any employee, whether based in California or 
elsewhere, is subject to the Workmen’s Compensation Insurance Act if the 
injury occurred within the state.27  Consequently, any employee, even if only 
temporarily employed in California, may collect from its employer using 
California’s workers’ compensation system as long as the work injury 
occurred within its borders.  For instance, a professional athlete may collect 
workers’ compensation in California for cumulative trauma by alleging a 
contributing injury occurred in just a single athletic event within California’s 
borders.  Thus, this provision reinforces the notion that California favors its 
own system of benefits over others and provides the statutory authority 
allowing NFL players that never played for a California-based team to file 
claims. 
Yet, this beneficial employee treatment is not absolute.  Subsection 
3600.5(b) includes a reciprocity provision exempting an out-of-state employer 
from the benefits under the Act if the employer’s home state also includes a 
similar reciprocity provision in its workers’ compensation laws.28  Meaning 
that if an out-of-state employer is located in a state that would apply California 
workers’ compensation law to a California employee injured within its 
borders, then California similarly would apply the governing law of the out-of-
state employer.29 
California’s strong public policy in favor of adjudicating claims arising 
from within its own borders is clearly demonstrated through these various 
provisions.  However, when an employer located outside of California seeks to 
challenge California’s broad jurisdiction pursuant to its laws absent such a 
reciprocity provision, courts have turned to the Full Faith and Credit Clause. 
B.  Full Faith and Credit Clause 
The U.S. Constitution states, “Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each 
State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other 
State.  And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which 
 
26.  See generally id. § 3600.5. 
27.  Id. § 3600.5(b). 
28.  Id. 
29.  See id. 
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such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.”30  
Congress later codified the clause in U.S. Code § 1738, declaring that any 
laws or judicial decisions in one state shall have the same effect in another.31 
By challenging jurisdiction over out-of-state workers’ compensation 
claims made by employees, employers or their insurance companies argue that 
other states’ judgments should not be given effect within their state’s 
borders.32  Consequently, the application of the Full Faith and Credit Clause in 
cases challenging California’s jurisdiction over workers’ compensation 
claims33 exemplifies the concept of giving effect to a state’s right of autonomy 
over claims within its own borders.  States have various interests in 
adjudicating workers’ compensation claims such as being the place where the 
employee entered into a contract, where the employee resided, or where the 
employee’s injury occurred.34  Further, the test of whether to apply a 
particular state’s law, according to the Full Faith and Credit Clause, is not a 
weighing of one state’s interest against that of another, but it is whether that 
state’s interest “is legitimate and substantial in itself.”35  As such, California 
established its legitimate interest in broad jurisdiction over workers’ 
compensation claims through a pair of Supreme Court decisions in the 1930s 
and a California case interpreting California’s workers’ compensation laws in 
conjunction with the Full Faith and Credit Clause.36 
C.  Application of Full Faith and Credit to Jurisdiction Issues in California 
Workers’ Compensation 
The Supreme Court first applied the Full Faith and Credit Clause to 
workers’ compensation cases in California in a non-sports context, which 
established the analysis framework for sports.  In Alaska Packers Ass’n v. 
Industrial Accident Commission, the Supreme Court upheld the validity of a 
workers’ compensation award in California because the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause did not mandate the application of Alaska law.37  In this case, a salmon 
canner entered into an employment contract in California for work primarily to 
 
30.  U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
31.  28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2006). 
32.  See, e.g., Alaska Packers Ass’n v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 294 U.S. 532, 539 (1935). 
33.  See generally, e.g., Pac. Emp’rs Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 306 U.S. 493 (1939); 
Alaska Packers, 294 U.S. 532. 
34.  9 LEX K. LARSON, LARSON'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW §142.03 (2012). 
35.  Id. 
36.  See generally, e.g., Pac. Emp’rs, 306 U.S. 493; Alaska Packers, 294 U.S. 532; Injured 
Workers’ Ins. Fund v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., 66 Cal. Comp. Cas. 923 (Ct. App. 2001). 
37.  Alaska Packers Ass’n, 294 U.S. at 548‒50. 
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be performed in Alaska.38  The employment contract explicitly provided that 
the parties would be bound by Alaska workers’ compensations laws; however, 
after being injured in Alaska, the employee filed for and was awarded 
workers’ compensation under California law related to the time that he spent 
in California.39  The Supreme Court held that California had an interest in 
adjudicating an employment relationship entered into within its border and 
that its interest was not inferior to Alaska’s interest, where the performance of 
the contract took place.40 
The extent of California’s jurisdictional reach was further developed in 
Pacific Employers Insurance Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission.41  In this 
case, the Supreme Court held that the Full Faith and Credit Clause did not 
require California to apply Massachusetts’ workers’ compensation law even 
though Massachusetts claimed exclusive jurisdiction over all claims made by 
injured employees of the state.42  The employee claiming workers’ 
compensation in California was a resident of Massachusetts and was employed 
under a contract entered into in Massachusetts.43  However, the employee was 
injured in California when he was temporarily working for his employer in 
that state.44  In its decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the California award 
to the employee and concluded that applying Massachusetts law interfered 
with California’s express policy of “apply[ing] its own provisions for 
compensation, to the exclusion of all others.”45 
Using the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the U.S. Supreme Court 
established precedent that one state may not legislate for another state and may 
not project its laws onto another state’s jurisdiction when the state’s legitimate 
interest in the claim is at issue.  Specifically within the realm of workers’ 
compensation, a state may not project its own laws into another by claiming an 
exclusive right to adjudicate the claim of an employee, such as an NFL player, 
who was injured while temporarily employed in another state because the state 
of injury has a legitimate interest in the outcome.46  NFL players practice and 
play games in the state where their team is based, but due to the nature of a 
sixteen-game season, including eight away games, the players will be 
 
38.  Id. at 538. 
39.  Id. at 538‒39. 
40.  Id. at 549‒50. 
41.  See generally Pac. Emp’rs, 306 U.S. 493. 
42.  Id. at 498, 504–05. 
43.  Id. at 497‒98. 
44.  Id. at 498. 
45.  Id. at 504–05. 
46.  See supra notes 37–45 and accompanying text. 
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temporarily employed in other states during most away games.47  Thus, by 
establishing a state’s right to adjudicate claims where an employee was injured 
while only temporarily within its borders, the Supreme Court laid the 
foundation for NFL players to file claims in California when they were injured 
during a game played within the state. 
D.  California’s Jurisdiction over Workers’ Compensation Claims in 
Professional Sports 
A California case built upon the foundation laid in Alaska Packers and 
Pacific Employers by refusing to review California’s jurisdiction over an NFL 
player’s cumulative trauma claim when the claimant played only a single 
game in the state.48  In Injured Workers’ Insurance Fund v. Workers’ 
Compensation Appeals Board, the California appellate court denied the review 
of California’s jurisdiction over a former Baltimore Colts player’s workers’ 
compensation claim because Maryland, the state of employment, offered no 
extra-territorial provision in its own laws that would exempt the Colts from 
California’s exclusive jurisdiction.49 
Numerous teams employed the player during his career including the 
Green Bay Packers, Buffalo Bills, and Baltimore Colts, but it was during his 
time with the Colts that he played his only game in California.50  His claim, 
though, was based on cumulative trauma suffered throughout his career as a 
professional football player.51  Within his claim for cumulative trauma, he also 
alleged that he suffered a specific injury while he played his only game in 
California.52  Even though the player was not a resident of California, did not 
enter into his employment contract in California, and worked only very 
temporarily in California, California properly exercised its jurisdiction over 
the claim.53  Consequently, this case can be said to have opened the door for 
 
47.  Only a few NFL teams are located within the same state as their adversaries, thus making 
interstate travel necessary.  For example, if the Houston Texans were to play the Dallas Cowboys, 
there would be no out-of-state temporary employment implications.  However, to play against the 
other teams within the Texans’ division, the players would at least be temporarily employed in 
Indiana, Tennessee, and Florida for one game each season.  See Houston Texans Schedule - 2012, 
ESPN, http://espn.go.com/nfl/team/schedule/_/name/hou/houston-texans (last visited Mar. 25, 2013). 
48.  Injured Workers’ Ins. Fund v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., 66 Cal. Comp. Cas. 923, 925–
26 (Ct. App. 2001). 
49.  Id. 
50.  Id. at 923. 
51.  Id. 
52.  Id. 
53.  Id. at 924‒26.  It should be noted that California’s jurisdiction was only proper for the 
claims against the Baltimore Colts.  Id. at 925.  The Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board 
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NFL players to file workers’ compensation claims in California based on 
cumulative trauma. 
III.  CHALLENGING CALIFORNIA’S JURISDICTION 
Hundreds of NFL players not playing for California teams have filed 
claims in the  California court system to collect workers’ compensation,54 and 
teams are determined to keep them out.  To start, challenging these claims 
necessarily implicates federal labor law because the terms of player 
employment are governed by a collective bargaining agreement between the 
National Football League Players Association (NFLPA) and the National 
Football League Management Council (NFLMC).55  As such, when players 
violate specific provisions concerning workers’ compensation in a collective 
bargaining agreement, the proper forum for resolution of those claims is 
arbitration.56  Moreover, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
weighed in on the issue of California’s jurisdiction in a recent review of an 
NFL workers’ compensation arbitration award.57  Despite the abundance of 
awareness brought to this issue, the question of whether NFL players can 
continue filing workers’ compensation claims in California is still unclear at 
best, but recent trends weigh against the players’ rights to choose where to file 
claims. 
A.  State Law Claims 
As NFL workers’ compensation issues began to garner media attention in 
the late 2000s, the Cincinnati Bengals began their fight against California’s 
jurisdiction in Ohio courtrooms.58  In 2008, the Bengals sought injunctions in 
Hamilton County, Ohio, against several of their former players, alleging they 
breached contractual provisions relating to Ohio’s exclusive jurisdiction over 
workers’ compensation claims by filing claims in California.59  Subsequently, 
 
reconsidered the claims against the Packers and Bills because the player never played in California 
with those teams, meaning that California had no jurisdiction over them.  Id. 
54.  Schwarz, supra note 1. 
55.  See Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act §301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (2006); 
NFL, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT art. II (2006) [hereinafter 2006 NFL CBA].  Although 
the NFLPA and NFLMC negotiated a new collective bargaining agreement in 2011, this Comment 
mainly refers to and focuses on provisions of the collective bargaining agreement from 2006 because 
it serves as the basis for the arbitration awards and the appeals opinion referred to in this and later 
sections. 
56.  See id. at art. IX, §§ 1, 6, art. X, §7. 
57.  See generally Matthews v. NFL Mgmt. Council, 688 F.3d  1107 (9th Cir. 2012).  
58.  Schwarz, supra note 1. 
59.  Cincinnati Bengals, Inc. v. Abdullah, No. 1:09-CV-738, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55252, at 
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the players removed the claim from the state court because the product of 
collective bargaining is subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of federal courts.60  
To maintain their claims made under Ohio law, the Bengals challenged the 
removal, arguing that the exclusive remedy provisions of the contracts 
implicated a substantial question of Ohio’s workmen’s compensation law and 
that the complaint was “nonremovable” under federal law.61  The court 
disagreed and concluded that the Bengals’ complaint did not allege any 
statutory violation of the exclusive remedy provision but rather alleged a state 
law breach of contract claim that did not involve a substantial question of 
Ohio’s workmen’s compensation law.62 
The court also confirmed the federal court’s jurisdiction by stating that it 
“seem[ed] clear that the resolution of the Bengals’ claims require[d] the 
interpretation of the contract clause . . . [to determine whether] players who 
have filed actions in California have violated their contracts.”63  In a 
subsequent opinion, the Ohio district court confirmed that the benefits 
awarded by a California tribunal were properly within California’s jurisdiction 
under the Full Faith and Credit Clause,64 affirmed California’s substantial 
interest in the players’ claims,65 and granted the players’ motion to compel 
arbitration.66 
According to this case, teams such as the Bengals cannot effectively 
challenge players’ California workers’ compensation claims through state 
common law remedies due to preemption by federal labor law.  Teams may 
prefer to keep claims within their own state courts because these courts may be 
more favorable for a variety of reasons, such as local fan support and revenue 
generation.  However, as discussed below, it is not necessarily true that a state 
court will be more favorable to its home team than an arbitrator or a federal 
court.67 
B.  Arbitration 
Two NFL arbitrators have specifically addressed the issue of forum 
 
*2 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 6, 2010). 
60.  Id. at *4. 
61.  Id. at *12–14. 
62.  See id. at *19–20. 
63.  Id. at *21. 
64.  Cincinnati Bengals, Inc. v. Abdullah, No. 1:09-CV-738, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54102, at 
*15–16 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 28, 2010). 
65.  See id. at *16. 
66.  Id. at *33. 
67.  See infra Part III.B–C. 
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selection and choice of law clauses in written awards, ultimately leading to a 
body of law in favor of teams and management in the NFL. 
Under article IX of the 2006 NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement (2006 
NFL CBA), any dispute regarding the interpretation or application of the 
collective bargaining agreement or the uniform player contract, which cannot 
be resolved by other means, is submitted to final and binding arbitration.68  
Due to the nature of arbitration as a private agreement between parties, the 
language of the disputed contract controls, and arbitrators base their decisions 
entirely on what was agreed upon.69  As such, in circumstances related to 
California’s jurisdiction over workers’ compensation claims, disputes over the 
specific language in the uniform player contract regarding choice of law and 
exclusive jurisdiction arise.70  Thus, arbitrators will not take California’s 
interest in adjudicating the claim into consideration like a judicial court would. 
On August 5, 2010, Arbitrator Calvin William Sharpe issued an arbitral 
award against Bruce Matthews, a former Tennessee Titans football player.71  
The dispute arose when the Tennessee Titans filed a grievance against 
Matthews for filing a workers’ compensation claim in California after he 
retired from a nineteen-year career.72  The team argued that filing a workers’ 
compensation claim in California violated forum selection and choice of law 
clauses in Matthews’s player contract with the team, which required any such 
claim to be filed in Texas73 or Tennessee and to be governed by each state’s 
respective laws.74  Specifically, the Titans cited paragraph 26D, which stated: 
Jurisdiction of all workers compensation claims and all other 
matters related to workers compensation . . . and including all 
issues of law, issues of fact, and matters related to workers 
compensation benefits, shall be exclusively determined by and 
exclusively decided in accordance with the internal laws of 
the State of Tennessee without resort to choice of law rules.75 
 
68.  2006 NFL CBA, supra note 55, art. IX, §§ 1, 8. 
69.  See ELKOURI & ELKOURI, HOW ARBITRATION WORKS 428, 435 (Alan M. Ruben ed., 6th 
ed. 2003). 
70.  See generally NFL Mgmt. Council v. NFL Players Ass'n (Aug. 5, 2010) (Sharpe, Arb.), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/2011_build/entertainment_sports/matthews_v
_tennessee_titans.authcheckdam.PDF [hereinafter Matthews Arbitration]; Chi. Bears v. Haynes (Apr. 
11, 2011) (Townley, Arb.), http://www.pcllp.net/Bears_Worrell.pdf [hereinafter Bears Arbitration]. 
71.  See generally Matthews Arbitration, supra note 70. 
72.  Id. at 3. 
73.  A claim could be filed in Texas under the contract because the Tennessee Titans were 
preceded as a franchise by the Houston Oilers.  See id. 
74.  Id. at 4. 
75.  Id. at 11. 
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The arbitrator also considered paragraph 22 of Matthews’s contract because it 
dealt with choosing Tennessee law to govern the agreement.76 
The Titans contended that paragraph 26D was a forum selection clause 
that gave exclusive jurisdiction to the state of Tennessee and prohibited filing 
of workers’ compensation claims in other states, such as California.77  
According to Arbitrator Sharpe, the clause did not provide Tennessee with 
exclusive jurisdiction but, rather, reflected a choice of law provision because 
the provision merely meant jurisdiction in workers’ compensation cases is one 
of many issues that will be decided by Tennessee law.78  Therefore, 
Matthews’s contract did not preclude him from filing his claim in California.79 
Unfortunately for Matthews, the inquiry into the propriety of his 
California claim was not complete.  While the claim remained in California, a 
California tribunal would determine which state’s law to apply and created the 
possibility of Tennessee law being rejected despite the choice of law clause.80  
However, the effect of the choice of law clause actually helped the Titans 
because it foreclosed on Matthews’s ability to argue for the application of 
California law even while in a California forum.81  The choice of law clause in 
the contract was mutually agreed upon and placed an equal responsibility on 
the parties to ensure the application of Tennessee law.82  Consequently, 
through Arbitrator Sharpe’s authority to interpret and enforce the provisions of 
the Matthews’s contract, he issued an award allowing the claim to remain in 
California but requiring the parties to stipulate to proceed under Tennessee 
law.83 
In 2011, another arbitrator heard a dispute regarding the application of a 
player contract choice of law and forum selection clauses that ran contrary to 
California’s jurisdiction over workers’ compensation claims.  In this instance, 
the Chicago Bears filed grievances with the NFL against former players 
Michael Haynes, Joe Odom, and Cameron Worrell for filing workers’ 
compensation claims in California and violating their player contracts (Bears’ 
contracts).84  Paragraph 33 of the Bears’ contracts stated, in part, 
“Furthermore, the exclusive jurisdiction for resolving injury related claims 
 
76.  Id. at 13–14. 
77.  Id. at 4. 
78.  Id. at 11‒12. 
79.  Id. at 14. 
80.  Id. 
81.  Id. at 15. 
82.  Id. 
83.  Id. at 18. 
84.  Bears Arbitration, supra note 70, at 1–2. 
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shall be the Illinois Industrial Commission of the State of Illinois, and in the 
case of Workers Compensation claims the Illinois Workers Compensation Act 
shall govern.”85 
Although this provision seems similar to paragraph 26D in the Matthews 
arbitration, Arbitrator Rosemary Townley reached a different conclusion.86  
Arbitrator Townley found that the language in the provision clearly reflected a 
forum selection clause, as it specified that any workers’ compensation claim 
was subject to Illinois law, thus falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
Illinois Industrial Commission.87  Therefore, unlike in the Matthews 
arbitration, the former players violated the Bears’ contracts by filing workers’ 
compensation claims in California and were ordered to cease and desist the 
pursuit of their claims.88 
Ultimately, these two arbitration awards had the same effect on the players 
despite being decided on different grounds: the awards precluded the players 
from receiving the favorable benefits of California’s workers’ compensation 
system.89  However, the distinction between the awards is worth taking notice 
of for future disputes over this issue because it emphasizes the importance of 
carefully drafting individual player contracts.  The Matthews award was based 
on the finding of a choice of law clause for any workers’ compensation 
claim;90 the Bears award was based on the finding of a forum selection 
clause.91  Arguably, the more specific language used in the Bears’ contracts 
provided a difficult obstacle for the players to overcome because the clause 
prohibited the claim from even being brought in the state.92  If the language in 
the Matthews’s player contract would have been slightly more ambiguous or 
interpreted just a little differently, then a California court could have decided 
which state’s laws to apply, and Matthews could have proceeded under 
California’s favorable laws.93 
Subsequently, Matthews and the Bears players petitioned federal courts to 
 
85.  Id. at 3. 
86.  Compare Matthews Arbitration, supra note 70, at 10–15, 18 (determining that the clause in 
the standard player contract was not a forum clause, but a law clause, and that the California Workers 
Compensation Board could only hear the matter if it applied Tennessee law), with Bears Arbitration, 
supra note 70, at 22–28 (illustrating that the standard player contract had both a forum clause and a 
law clause that prevented the players from filing workers’ compensation claims in California). 
87.  Bears Arbitration, supra note 70, at 27. 
88.  Id. at 29. 
89.  Id.; Matthews Arbitration, supra note 70, at 18. 
90.  Matthews Arbitration, supra note 70, at 18. 
91.  Bears Arbitration, supra note 70, at 29. 
92.  See id. 
93.  See Matthews Arbitration, supra note 70, at 10–15, 18 
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vacate the arbitrators’ awards with little success.94  Matthews then appealed 
his case to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.95 
C.  Ninth Circuit Case 
On appeal in the Ninth Circuit, Bruce Matthews sought to vacate the 
arbitration award barring him from pursuing his workers’ compensation claim 
in California.96  He claimed that the award violated California public policy, 
federal labor policy, and the Full Faith and Credit Clause.97  The court 
affirmed the award on the basis that California lacked jurisdiction over 
Matthews’s claim in the first place, but the holding was very fact-specific and 
limited to the case at hand.98  As such, although the court ruled against 
Matthews, it did not completely foreclose on the possibility of former NFL 
players pursuing legitimate claims in California. 
Federal courts will rarely vacate arbitration awards except in a few narrow 
circumstances such as an alleged violation of public policy or an arbitrator 
exceeding his power.99  In this case, Matthews first alleged that the award 
violated California’s public policy against contractual agreements “waivi[ng] 
an employee’s right to seek California workers’ compensation 
benefits . . . .”100  Matthews supported his conclusion of a “well-defined and 
dominant [no waiver] public policy” in California with various statutory 
provisions as well as case law on the matter.101  However, the court concluded 
that California’s public policy only extended the right to seek workers’ 
compensation benefits to employees who are eligible to receive benefits under 
the statutory regime.102  In this case, Matthews failed to establish that his 
claim fell within the scope of the court’s interpretation of California’s “no 
waiver” rule because nothing in the record supported a conclusion that he 
 
94.  See generally NFL Players Ass’n v. NFL Mgmt. Council, No. 10CV1671, 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 865 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2011) (illustrating Bruce Matthews’s unsuccessful appeal of the 
arbitration decision preventing his workers’ compensation claim in California); Chi. Bears Football 
Club, Inc. v. Haynes, 816 F. Supp. 2d 534 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (illustrating the former Bears players’ 
unsuccessful attempt to vacate the arbitrator’s awards in favor of the Chicago Bears). 
95.  See generally Matthews v. NFL Mgmt. Council, 688 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 2012) 
(representing Bruce Matthews’s appeal to the Ninth Circuit to have the arbitration decision rendered 
against him vacated). 
96.  Id. at 1109. 
97.  See id. at 1109–10. 
98.  See id. at 1110. 
99.  See id. at 1111, 1115. 
100.  Id. at 1111. 
101.  Id. 
102.  Id. at 1111–12. 
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suffered any discrete injury while temporarily employed within California.103  
Claiming every game he played in, including those within California, 
contributed to the cumulative injuries he suffered from was an insufficient 
theory to justify extending California’s public policy because the court was 
uncertain whether a California tribunal would even accept coverage of an 
employee under these circumstances.104  Thus, the court failed to find any 
violation of California’s public policy. 
Matthews also failed to convince the court that the award violated federal 
labor policy against bargaining away minimum labor standards and the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause.105  The court could not find a violation of labor 
policy because, as mentioned above, California’s jurisdiction over the claim 
was unclear at best.106  As such, Matthews was unable to show that he was 
deprived of any benefit he was entitled to under California law.107  Similarly, 
he could not show that the arbitrator exceeded his power by choosing to ignore 
the application of California law during the proceedings in violation of the 
Full Faith and Credit Clause.108  According to the court, nothing in the facts of 
the case justified California’s right to apply its law because, again, Matthews 
could not show California had a substantial interest in adjudicating the claim 
due to insufficient contacts.109 
Within the opinion, the court identified a clear standard by stating, “An 
employee who makes a prima facie showing that his claim falls within the 
scope of California’s workers’ compensation regime may indeed be able to 
establish that an arbitration award prohibiting him from seeking such benefits 
violates California policy.”110  Though the court introduced this standard 
within its discussion of California jurisdiction, the standard also could have 
been applicable to Matthews’s other arguments regarding the arbitrator’s 
power and federal labor policy if the court had announced that California had 
jurisdiction over the claim.111 
Although the court clearly concluded that Matthews did not meet this 
standard, it is possible he could have qualified for benefits upon the 
determination of a California tribunal despite the court’s uncertainty 
 
103.  Id. at 1113 & n.4. 
104.  Id. at 1114. 
105.  Id. at 1114–16. 
106.  Id. at 1115. 
107.  Id. 
108.  Id. at 1115–17. 
109.  Id. at 1116. 
110.  Id. at 1114.  
111.  See id. at 1115–17. 
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determination.  The court’s opinion was flawed when it distinguished the facts 
of Matthews’s case from existing California cases regarding Matthews’s 
failure to justify the application of California law based on his limited contacts 
with the state.  To the contrary, as discussed earlier in Injured Workers’ 
Insurance Fund, a California tribunal upheld its jurisdiction over a former 
NFL player’s workers’ compensation claim in California when he played only 
one game within the state with the Baltimore Colts.112  In Matthews’s case, 
the court actually took judicial notice that his teams played thirteen games in 
California during his career.113  The court’s opinion failed to take the Colts 
player’s case into account when it decided that the legitimacy of Matthews’s 
claim in California was unclear; as Injured Workers’ shows, it is plausible that 
a California tribunal could accept a cumulative trauma claim based on injuries 
suffered during thirteen games played in California. 
Despite the court’s perhaps erroneous jurisdictional uncertainty 
declaration, Matthews’s claims may have had other fatal flaws.  Most 
importantly, Matthews never claimed to have suffered a specific injury in any 
one of those thirteen games that his teams played in California.  Based on the 
underlying theory of his claim, he should have argued he suffered an injury in 
each of those games played within California; however, he did not allege any 
specific injury during any game. 
The fact-specific nature of the court’s analysis is important to former NFL 
players seeking workers’ compensation in California because the law has not 
yet completely foreclosed on the possibility to file legitimate claims.  Based on 
the court’s opinion, it is critical for such claims to allege sufficient contacts 
with California through a specific injury suffered within the state that 
contributed to the cumulative trauma.  However, as some questions over the 
validity of such workers’ compensation claims remain unanswered at large, 
former players should consider other means by which they can be adequately 
compensated for their workplace injuries. 
IV.  ALTERNATIVES TO CALIFORNIA’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION SYSTEM 
With recent NFL arbitration awards enforcing player contract forum 
selection and choice of law clauses as well as the Ninth Circuit’s holding, 
California’s jurisdiction over many former NFL players’ workers’ 
compensation claims will be less likely to come in the years ahead.  As such, 
practical alternatives must be put forth into a forum for discussion.  One such 
 
112.  See supra notes 51–53 and accompanying text. 
113.  Compare Injured Workers’ Ins. Fund v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., 66 Cal. Comp. 
Cas. 923, 924–26 (Ct. App. 2001), with Matthews, 688 F. 3d at 1113. 
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alternative is for players and teams to negotiate in good faith to ensure that 
these workers’ compensation issues are resolved.  Another option is through 
separate legal action by former players against the NFLPA to attain greater 
benefits than in past collective bargaining agreements; however, the viability 
of this alternative is questionable based on recent events in litigation over the 
issue. 
A.  Alternative Dispute Resolution Between Players and Teams 
The 2011 NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement (the Agreement) 
addresses workers’ compensation issues such as benefits, rejection of 
coverage, and off-sets almost identically to the way they were addressed in the 
2006 NFL CBA.114  However, several significant changes were made to the 
Agreement due to the recent issues concerning workers’ compensation claims 
in California.  For instance, Article 41 of the Agreement, the workers’ 
compensation section, begins by stating, “The parties shall continue to discuss 
in good faith appropriate reforms and revisions to the provisions of this 
Agreement and the Player Contract related to workers’ compensation 
issues.”115 
As demonstrated earlier, forum selection and choice of law clauses are not 
only commonplace in player contracts but are also integral to resolving 
workers’ compensation jurisdiction issues.  The language included in these 
provisions will determine the nature of the clauses depending upon their 
relative specificity or vagueness.  Because the language, when used 
effectively, determines whether a player can receive California benefits, 
players have a strong interest in bargaining for terms in their best interests.  As 
such, the mandate to negotiate in good faith should ensure that players and 
teams bargain for mutually acceptable language or else leave open the 
possibility for such forum selection or choice of law clauses being 
unenforceable as unconscionable.116 
Other notable changes include section 5, which is the “carve-out” 
provision.117  It provides that “[t]he parties shall immediately establish a joint 
committee that will make good faith efforts to negotiate a possible California 
 
114.  See 2011 NFL CBA, supra note 11, art. 41; see also 2006 NFL CBA, supra note 55, art. 
LIV. 
115.  2011 NFL CBA, supra note 11, art. 41 (emphasis added). 
116.  A court could strike this type of clause as unconscionable when the terms are not 
negotiated in good faith as demanded by the 2011 NFL CBA because it suffers from procedural 
unfairness through a lack of bargaining power.  See JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON 
CONTRACTS 482, 490–91 (3d ed. 1990). 
117.  See 2011 NFL CBA, supra note 11, art. 41, § 5. 
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Workers’ compensation alternative dispute resolution program on a trial basis 
(i.e., carve out).”118  Along the same lines, another section addressing 
reservation of rights preserves the rights of any existing claims involving 
workers’ compensation issues over choice of law or forum provisions in player 
contracts.119 
The carve-out provision is in the best interest of both management and 
players because it allows them to develop an alternative dispute resolution 
system to resolve the issue of California workers’ compensation claims 
without resorting to arbitration and eventually courts.  Mandating mediation 
before arbitration is a plausible scenario.  Mediation is a cost-effective dispute 
resolution procedure that utilizes a neutral third party for a variety of purposes, 
such as facilitating negotiations or evaluating the merit of certain positions.120  
Furthermore, mediation does not necessarily lead to a final, binding decision if 
the parties do not eventually reach an agreement.121  This would be an 
effective method for the NFL to employ on a trial basis to resolve California 
workers’ compensation disputes because it provides a forum to evaluate each 
case independently.  When players file claims in California, the circumstances 
of each case are different, and some may have more legitimate bases.  A 
mediator with experience in workers’ compensation and disability benefits 
could evaluate each case based on the severity of the alleged injury and the 
need for additional compensation beyond that provided through collective 
bargaining to reach a reasonable settlement up to the level of benefits that 
California could provide.  Allowing evaluation on a case-by-case basis also 
eliminates the potential problems of establishing an arbitral precedent on the 
issue.122 
For now, arbitration is the sole forum for dispute resolution of workers’ 
compensation issues in the NFL based on the Agreement.  Each arbitration 
decision is made upon the interpretation of a specific player contract or the 
Agreement itself.123  The establishment of a mandatory mediation program 
prior to arbitration, as discussed above, will eliminate some of the unnecessary 
costs involved with private arbitration and the strict adherence to unfair 
contractual provisions in some instances.  However, should the mediation 
 
118.  Id. 
119.  Id. art. 41, § 6. 
120.  Mediation Procedure, CPR, http://www.cpradr.org/Resources/ALLCPRArticles/tabid/265 
/ID/613/Mediation-Procedure.aspx (last visited Mar. 26, 2013). 
121.  Id. 
122.  See generally W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Toward a Theory of Precedent in Arbitration, 51 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1895 (2010). 
123.  See ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 69, at 428, 435. 
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process fail, arbitration will still be the final forum as designated by the 
Agreement. 
Overall, these new provisions represent a different strategy to combat the 
slew of former players seeking workers’ compensation in California without 
infringing too much on players’ rights.  Mandating good faith negotiation or 
mediation prior to arbitration may provide the parties with an alternative venue 
to work out a mutually beneficial resolution before undergoing an arduous, 
expensive proceeding, and the Agreement provides the mechanisms to explore 
these alternatives. 
B.  Retired Players’ Legal Action for Collective Bargaining Rights 
Additionally, the Agreement expanded the disability benefits available to 
former players.  However, for a group of retired players led by Carl Eller, the 
NFLPA did not go far enough to protect the rights of NFL players after their 
careers were over.124  Consequently, they filed a lawsuit against the 
NFLPA,125 but it was dismissed in May 2012.126  Now, the fate of the lawsuit 
rests on the appeal filed and pending in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit.127 
Disability benefits were previously provided through the Bert Bell/Pete 
Rozelle NFL Retirement Plan and the NFL Supplemental Disability Plan;128 
the Agreement combines and improves those two sections through the NFL 
Player Disability Plan in Article 61.129  In general, this plan defines 
disabilities, sets the amount of benefits available for categories of disabilities, 
and establishes procedures for collecting such benefits.130  Some 
improvements made through collective bargaining in 2011—in addition to 
efficiency through consolidation—include redefining “Total and Permanent 
Disability” (T&P Disability), re-categorizing levels of T&P Disabilities, and 
increasing the benefits available to some categories of T&P Disabilities.131  
 
124.  Retired NFL Players File Suit Against NFLPA, Smith, Brady Plaintiffs, SPORTING NEWS 
(Sept. 13, 2011), http://aol.sportingnews.com/nfl/story/2011-09-13/retired-nfl-players-file-suit-
against-nflpa-demaurice-smith-brady-plaintiffs#ixzz1XtiDY4UX. 
125.  See generally Eller Complaint, supra note 11. 
126.  See Eller v. NFL Players Ass’n, 872 F. Supp. 2d 823, 838 (D. Minn. 2012). 
127.  Associated Press, Retirees Appeal Dismissed Lawsuit vs. NFLPA, YAHOO! SPORTS 
(June 21, 2012), http://sports.yahoo.com/news/retirees-appeal-dismissed-lawsuit-vs-215951975--
nfl.html. 
128.  2006 NFL CBA, supra note 55, arts. XLVII, LI. 
129.  2011 NFL CBA, supra note 11, art. 61. 
130.  Id. 
131.  Id.; NFL ALUMNI ASS’N, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT FAQS 4 (2011), 
available at http://www.nflalumniplayers.com/sites/www.nflalumniplayers.com/files/cba-faqs.pdf 
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The Agreement also improved the 88 Plan, which provides medical benefits 
for vested players suffering from dementia, Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis 
(ALS), and Parkinson’s disease by increasing the maximum benefits available 
to eligible recipients.132  Furthermore, the Agreement created “Neuro-
Cognitive Disability Benefits” to provide relief in certain circumstances to 
players suffering from “permanent, neuro-cognitive impairment” who are 
ineligible to receive benefits under the disability plan.133  These neuro-
cognitive benefits provide monthly limited benefits no less than $1500 or 
$3000, depending on the level of impairment, until the player reaches the age 
of 55 or is eligible under another NFL benefit plan.134 
However, it was evident that these improvements were not good enough 
for a class of retired players.  In September 2011, the class led by Carl Eller 
filed its lawsuit against the NFLPA after the Agreement went into effect.135  
According to the complaint, the “[retirement] system is acknowledged as 
deficient and flawed both with respect to pensions and administration of 
benefit programs.”136  Supporting the allegations regarding the inherent 
failures of the collectively bargained benefits system, the complaint noted that, 
as of 2010, only 3154 players were receiving disability benefits under the 
former plan137 and 151 players were receiving benefits under the 88 Plan.138  
The class also claimed that the NFLPA bargained for improved wages of 
current players at the “expense of the rights of, and benefits due to, retirees”139 
and further stated  that “the NFLPA has been a substantial cause of the 
insufficient/inadequate retiree benefits, programs and operations.”140  Several 
retired players even felt cheated by the current players because they did not 
receive the additional $300 million to $500 million in extra benefits promised 
during early rounds of bargaining.141  As such, the class sought declaratory 
relief to establish that the NFLPA and its representatives have no right to 
represent retired players in bargaining, to establish that the class has the right 
to negotiate for retiree benefits, and to remove any terms of the Agreement 
 
[hereinafter FAQs]. 
132.  2011 NFL CBA, supra note 11, art. 58; FAQs, supra note 131, at 5. 
133.  2011 NFL CBA, supra note 11, art. 65, § 1; FAQs, supra note 131, at 5. 
134.  2011 NFL CBA, supra note 11, art. 65, § 3; FAQs, supra note 131, at 5. 
135.  See generally Eller Complaint, supra note 11.  
136.  Id. ¶ 61.  
137.  Id. ¶ 48. 
138.  Id. ¶ 58. 
139.  Id. ¶ 64. 
140.  Id. ¶ 79. 
141.  See id. ¶¶ 86–87; Associated Press, supra note 127. 
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related to issues affecting retiree benefits.142 
The district court did not agree with the class’s contentions and dismissed 
the case.143  The court found that the NFLPA did not create a dispute with the 
retired players’ rights because the NFLPA actually negotiated substantial 
benefits for its retired counterparts despite having no legal obligation to do 
so.144  Furthermore, the court said it was in no position to determine the 
adequacy of the bargained-for benefits on behalf of the retired players, and 
noted that the NFLPA had no legal duty to achieve any certain level of 
benefits through collective bargaining.145  Moreover, the members of the class 
were at most third-party beneficiaries of the Agreement and only had the right 
to challenge the Agreement if they were not receiving benefits they were 
entitled to, which was not the case.146  Granting declaratory judgment for the 
class would have required the Agreement to be renegotiated to attain greater 
benefits for retired players, but it also would have imposed a legal obligation 
on the NFL, which was not a party to the lawsuit.147 
For now, it is unlikely that the class will receive any legal relief.  
However, if the class is successful in its pending appeal and moves forward 
with the lawsuit, this would have drastic implications not only for the parties 
to the lawsuit but for the NFL as well.  Assuming the class could use its legal 
leverage to bring the NFLPA back to the bargaining table with the NFL solely 
to negotiate retired players’ disability benefits, retired players could finally get 
a voice.  Through these negotiations, they could work to reform the procedures 
for obtaining benefits and challenging eligibility denials.  If money for retiree 
benefits was the contentious issue for both the NFL and the NFLPA, 
reforming the system rather than augmenting the total amount of benefits 
available would allow more players to receive the benefits currently available 
under the system.  When more players are able to receive the benefits they are 
entitled to under the Agreement, it may lessen the burden on NFL teams when 
their former players file workers’ compensation claims in California. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In recent years, California’s employee-friendly workers’ compensation 
system attracted the attention of professional athletes, especially NFL players.  
 
142.  Eller Complaint, supra note 11, ¶¶ 134–36. 
143.  See Eller v. NFL Players Ass’n, 872 F. Supp. 2d 823, 838 (D. Minn. 2012). 
144.  Id. at 835. 
145.  Id. at 836. 
146.  Id.  
147.  Id. at 836–37. 
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California’s liberal legislation and judicial construction allows NFL players to 
file claims when they are injured within the state, even if the player only 
played a single game within the borders of the state and the alleged injury was 
cumulative.  Thus, the challenge for NFL players is not to get the claim into 
California but, rather, to keep it there. 
Consequently, NFL teams are not likely to litigate or settle workers’ 
compensation claims in California without first challenging its jurisdiction 
through arbitration.  In state courtrooms, California’s jurisdiction is likely to 
remain intact based on Supreme Court precedent and adherence to the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause.  Conversely, recent arbitration awards favoring teams 
and the Ninth Circuit’s decision on the issue strongly suggest that the law may 
foreclose on California’s interest in adjudicating these claims in favor of 
adherence to player contract provisions. 
Should the NFL prevail in keeping claims out of California, the resolution 
of this issue is best left between the adverse parties: the players and the NFL.  
Collective bargaining in 2011 addressed some concerns but did not completely 
resolve them.  Changes to article 41 of the Agreement could result in stronger 
policies favoring players’ ability to bargain for better individual contractual 
provisions to protect against cumulative, long-term injuries.  Moreover, the 
retired players may have an opportunity to bargain for their own benefits after 
their careers are over depending on the outcome of the Eller lawsuit. 
For now, NFL players will continue to file workers’ compensation claims 
in California, and teams will continue to fight against California’s jurisdiction.  
Moreover, as the prevalence of former NFL players suffering from cumulative 
head trauma during their career rises, the number of workers’ compensation 
claims in California is likely to increase.  Thus, it is crucial that all parties 
involved in the situation work together to resolve the issue because it will only 
continue to grow and intensify.  Down . . . set . . . 
